

SOME IMPARTIAL
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Standing Army ;
Addressed to the WHOLE
PEOPLE
OF
ENGLAND.

By a Member of PARLIAMENT.



LONDON,


*Printed for J. ROBERTS at the Oxford-Arms in
Warwick-Lane. MDCCXXXII.*

THE NATIONAL

OF THE

AMERICAN

REPUBLIC



OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE

OF THE



T H E
S T A N D I N G A R M Y

Impartially considered by a

Member of Parliament.



THE Gentlemen who oppose the Administration, having long since stopped their Ears to *Argument*, and determined never to listen to *Reason*, I desire they will not imagine that I address myself to them. I appeal to those who are more impartial Judges of *both*, *The Commons of England*. To these then I think it my Duty, as one

B

of

of their Representatives, to give an Account of my Conduct in Parliament : To their Censure, or their Approbation, I refer myself, by acquainting them upon what Grounds I proceeded when I used that Power which they have devolved upon me, in voting for the *Standing Army*.

I think myself the more obliged to do it, as this is made the principal Topick of *Clamour* ; as it is more particularly made use of to persuade the *People* that their Interests are abandoned by the *Legislature* ; and as it is the Point by which the Enemies of the Nation and Government have pushed their Attack with the greatest *Affiduity*, and the most fatal *Success*.

THE Method that is taken to alarm the People upon this Head, is to bring them numerous Examples out of antient and modern *History*, particularly out of the *Roman*, of the Calamities that they say have fallen on other Countries by the Maintenance of a *Standing Army*. —
 They

They pretend that all Nations, and more remarkably that, have lost their *Liberties* by this Means; and they draw Parallels between the former Circumstances of *that* Country, and the present Condition of *our own*.

ON the other Hand, I shall lay down two Positions, which I shall endeavour to prove: One, That the *Roman Commonwealth* did not lose its Liberties from that Cause; the other, That the Circumstances of *that* Country were widely different from those of *our own*. My Observations will chiefly relate to their Government, as that has supplied them principally with Matter on this Subject.

IN order therefore to clear up these two Propositions, I shall beg leave to look back a little to the early Times of that mighty Empire. We shall find that even then, long *before* they maintained a Standing Force, their Calamities were as great as *after*. They were perpetually harassed with Attempts against their Liberties, car-

ried on either by *single Men*, as the *Mel-
lius's*, *Manlius's*, &c. or by the *whole
Body* of the *Patricians*. They were dai-
ly disturbed by *Clamours* and *Sedition*,
which rendered the very *Liberty* for which
they struggled, as intolerable as *Servitude*
itself.

AS we descend lower, as that Com-
wealth *increased*, and consequently as
Corruption grew stronger, we find that
these Attacks against the Liberties of the
People became more frequent, and their
Abilities to resist them insensibly grew
weaker. After the last *Punick War*, *Rome*
rose to be the Mistress of the *World*, and
and every *private Member* of the Com-
monwealth imagined himself a *Prince*.
Their Pride naturally produced *Ambition*,
and *Ambition* stirred up *Marius* against
Sylla, *Pompey* against *Cæsar*, or rather
raised them all against their *Country*, till
at length, unable to withstand *Corruption*
longer, it fell a Prey to the last of those
four Competitors.

IN this second Period, the Calamities of *Rome* are more strongly ascribed to the Army. It is pretended, that this great *Revolution*, the Change of the *Republican* into the *Monarchical* Government, was brought about by the *Army*. It is asserted, that *that People were plunged from a State of Liberty into that of Slavery, by the Army.*

I shall confess that this Revolution was effected by the Army; but I must say on the other Hand, that it was not caused by it. The true Occasion was the intolerable *Ambition* and *Corruption* of the Citizens of *Rome*, that antient *Bane* of Government, that Infirmary existing in all *terrestrial* Constitutions, which hinders their Duration from being *perpetual*. All Commonwealths degenerate into Monarchies, and this had indubitably been its Fate (and that perhaps much sooner) if there had been no *Standing Army*. The *Cataline* Conspiracy struck as deep at the Liberties of *Rome*, tho' the *Army* was not engaged

engaged in it ; so far from it, that it was the *Army*, and the *Army* more than *Cicero's* Care, that saved for that Time the Freedom of their Country.

WHEN we look into the third and last Period of this powerful Empire, that Space of Time contained between the Usurpation of *Julius Cæsar* and the Reign of the last Emperor *Augustulus* ; we behold a Scene of Blood and Murder, Desolation and Rapine, no where to be paralleled in History. We view the most glorious Government in the World, as it were on its Death - Bed, in its last Agonies. And what is more to the Point, we see the *Army* concerned in all this lamentable Process, and *corrupt* to the highest Degree ; but then we see them concerned in the *Preservation* of their Country, as well as in the *Disturbance* of it. We see them *corrupt*, but corrupt not from their *own Nature*, but from the *general Infection*.

WHEN Governments decay, when their *Courage* droops, when that *Virtue*
which

which first raised them, is changed into Self-Interest, Corruption and Ambition; then every Step that can be taken to *patch up* the bleeding Constitution, every Measure that can be entered into with a *View* of restoring it to its former *Vigour*, every Expedient that can be attempted to prevent the impending Calamity, serves only to hinder its expiring for a *few* Moments, and proves in the End itself a Means to effect its *Destruction*.

THE *Roman Army* was thus far the Ruin of the *Roman Empire*: It was one of the Instruments that *Time* made use of to that End. But the *same Time* had brought the *same Thing* to pass, without that Instrument. The only Difference consisted in *this*, that it had been overwhelmed by the *Goths* and *Vandals* some Ages sooner, if no *Army* had interfered.

FROM what has been already said, I think my *first* Position has been sufficiently illustrated, *viz.* That the *Roman*
Common-

Commonwealth lost not its Liberty by its *Army*. It appears, that its Misfortunes were purely owing to the Vicissitude of human Affairs.——And it is evident, that the Standing Force contributed rather to its *Preservation*, than its *Dissolution*.

I shall now apply myself to the Examination of my *second* Proposition ; That the Circumstances of *that* Republick were widely different from those of *our* own.

FROM which *Proposition* I design *this* Advantage, To convince *those* who may not be already convinced by my *former* Arguments, that a *Standing Army* is not at this Time dangerous to our *Liberties*. For though we should allow, contrary to what I think I have proved, that the *Roman* Commonwealth was ruined by an *Army* ; yet it will so plainly appear by what follows, that *our* Condition is *different* from *theirs*, that even in that Case it will be no kind of Consequence, that we
ought

ought to entertain any Apprehensions from it.

IN the first Place ; If we consider *their* Constitution before the Subversion of it by *Cæsar*, we find it *Republican*, whereas ours is *Monarchical* : And this makes a prodigious Difference with respect to the *Point* in Question. In *Republicks* (as I have observed before) there is a natural Tendency to *Monarchy*, and as soon as any one Member, by any Means, breaks through that *Equality* which is essential to that kind of *Government*, rises to a higher Point than the rest of his Fellow Citizens ; he leaps with Ease into the *Seat* of *Monarchy*, which seldom is limited, seldom favourable to the Liberties of a *People*, when introduced in that *irregular* Manner.

AN *Army* therefore is dangerous to *Constitutions* of this kind, since it furnishes Opportunities to *particular* Persons of raising themselves to that unequal Height I have just now mentioned.

C

BUT

BUT in *Monarchies* the Case is in no respect the same ; no *General* can by any means climb so high ; he must always have still *one* above him, whose Authority must be greater than his own. There will be always one who will share his Glory with him ; who, though he has no Merit in them, will reap the Benefit of all his Actions. The Government of *England* was never *Republican* but *once*, and *then*, indeed, it suffered by the *Army* ; but it suffered only because it was a *Republick* : That very *Army* which was then so turbulent, since the Restoration of our old Constitution, has been ever quiet and governable, never giving us Occasion to apprehend any thing from them.

WHEN the *Roman* Commonwealth was transformed into a *Monarchy*, there were other Circumstances which rendered its Condition entirely different from *ours* : For (besides its Corruption, its restless Spirit, and its Desire of Change, which I have already observed, and I cannot

not too often observe, to be the *Root* of all publick Calamities) the vast *Extent* of its Dominions, the *Power* of its Provinces, and the *Distance* of those Provinces from their *Head*, not only obliged it to maintain an immoderate *Standing* Force, but prodigiously exposed it to the *Ambition* of every single General; any ill-designing Man might couch his *evil* Intention, and disguise his Military Preparations under the *specious* Pretence of some *new* Rebellion, some intended *Plot* in the Province he commanded: Nor could his *real* Design be discovered at so great a Distance, 'till he had put himself and his Affairs into such a *Posture* as to be able to contend for *Empire*.

ANOTHER Circumstance which greatly favoured these frequent Revolutions, was, that the *Empire* was hereditary in no one particular *Family*. The *Scepter* had been tossed from *one* Hand to *another*, and had never continued long enough in one *Line* for the People to have acquired any Attachment to *one* more than to *another*.

This render'd it indifferent to them who obtained the *Throne*, and made it less difficult for any *private* Man to procure it.

ON the other Hand, our Circumstances are not parallel to these in any one Respect. I am sensible that some have insinuated our Corruption and Ambition to be as great: But who is it that asserts it? How is it proved? It is asserted by those who are notorious for *Ambition* and *Corruption* themselves. It is proved only by their *own Example*. I must confess that we have Instances of this *Vice* in its most *glaring* Colours; That *Ambition*, with all its direful Train of *Passions*, Calumny and Detraction, Malice and Envy, Hatred and Revenge, Falshood, pretended Patriotism, and Treason, has made its Appearance with as much Assurance in *this* as in any *precedent* Age. But, Thanks to Heaven! its Followers are *few*, marked out to publick View, despised, abhor'd; abandoned by all Men of Sense and Prudence, of Probity
and

and Honour, in the same *high* Degree as they themselves are given up to their Crimes ; and consequently as little to be *fear'd*, as they deserve to be *esteem'd*.

IN a Dispute which like this is maintain'd singly by an *Ipse dixit*, no other kind of Arguments are requisite to defend *one Side* of the Question, than are made use of on the *other*. My positive Assertion, therefore, that what has been insinuated of this Nature is *false*, might have as just a Weight as their bold Allegations to the *contrary*. But I scorn to employ Weapons myself, the Use of which I condemn in others. I shall therefore make one Observation, which will be sufficient to expose the Falshood of that affectionate Complaint, that agreeable Compliment to the Nation, *That it is universally corrupt*.

THIS Observation is, *That never any Age was so productive of Scandal and Defamation, of Libels and seditious Discourses against the Government ; and that*

no Time can afford us so many Instances of Moderation in a Country under those Circumstances. The Observation is frequently made; but the natural Inference from it is not so common. It is the highest Proof that our Corruption is not such as is pretended; For the never-failing Consequence of Corruption in a People, is an Addition of Power and Authority to the Prince: Which Addition we have as yet seen no Instances of; and we should not probably have failed seeing some, if that had been the Case, the Provocation having been so extravagantly great.

OUR Condition is still more *different* with relation to the *Extent* of our Dominions. Our Kingdom is happily composed in such a manner, that the *Members* are neither too unweildy for the *Body*, nor the *Body* too weighty for its *Members*. It is formed in so just a *Medium*, that it is neither confined within so narrow *Limits*, as to be unable to perform with the utmost *Vigour* the Offices of a most powerful Commonwealth; nor are its

its Territories so *extended*, as to render it subject to the Infirmities of a vast *Empire*. Nature itself has set *Bounds* to our *Monarchy*, which hitherto we have *kept*, and which as long as we shall *keep*, we can never have *Occasion*, nor can there be possibly any *Pretence*, for a Standing *Force* so great as to endanger our *Liberties*.

IN the last Difference between *our* Government and the *Roman*, consists the greatest Happiness of this Nation. It is our Blessing, and such a Blessing as we can never sufficiently prize, never be sufficiently thankful for, that we have a settled Succession, a Family seated on the *Throne*, and such a Family as no antient Story can parallel, no modern Kingdom can boast. We have a Prince whose numerous Virtues render him the Darling of the People: A Prince who can have no Temptation to invade the Rights of his Subjects, as he receives all those Advantages from their *just* Affection, which he could propose from an *unjust* Dominion.
 — A Prince, in short, who makes the
 Law

Law of the Land the Rule of his Government; who had rather hurt his own Prerogative, than do any thing that might favour of arbitrary Power, tho' qualified at the same time to make a People happy even in *that State*, if Happiness could be consistent with it.

FROM what has been said, I think that an impartial Man may be convinced, that the *Romans* did not lose their Liberties by a *Standing Army*, and that *our* Circumstances are not in any respect the same with *theirs*. I have spent some time in the Consideration of these *two* Points, because I think they are of Importance to expose the Weakness as well as the Unfairness of the other Side of the Question.

BUT to set the Matter still in a *clearer* Light. Let us for *once* allow all that they assert to be *true*. Let us for the present neglect to controvert a Position they are so extremely fond of——That a Standing Army is always dangerous——Let

us then examine, whether, even in *that* Case, any Representative of the *People* may be with Justice reflected on as an *Enemy* to his Country, who at this time gives his *Vote* to maintain it.

THERE is a Maxim, the Reasonableness of which no Person has ever yet disputed, that *of two Evils we ought to chuse the least*. From this Maxim it appears plainly, that in *some* Turns of Affairs the *heaviest* Burden may seem *light* to a Nation; even this *odious* Thing an Army, *desireable*. This may perhaps be our Case. And in order to know whether it is or not, we must consider the State of Affairs both *abroad* and *at home*: Both which, as far as it relates to the present Subject in debate, may be done in a few Words.—

Abroad all our neighbouring Potentates maintain a very considerable Standing Force—*At home* we are divided into Parties; and we have a *Popish* Pretender to the Crown, from whose Family Principle, his Religion, and the Manner he must come in (if he were to come in at all)

D

we

Law of the Land the Rule of his Government; who had rather hurt his own Prerogative, than do any thing that might favour of arbitrary Power, tho' qualified at the same time to make a People happy even in *that State*, if Happiness could be consistent with it.

FROM what has been said, I think that an impartial Man may be convinced, that the *Romans* did not lose their Liberties by a *Standing Army*, and that *our* Circumstances are not in any respect the same with *theirs*. I have spent some time in the Consideration of these *two* Points, because I think they are of Importance to expose the Weakness as well as the Unfairness of the other Side of the Question.

BUT to set the Matter still in a *clearer* Light. Let us for *once* allow all that they assert to be *true*. Let us for the present neglect to controvert a Position they are so extremely fond of——That a Standing Army is always dangerous——Let

us then examine, whether, even in *that* Case, any Representative of the *People* may be with Justice reflected on as an *Enemy* to his Country, who at this time gives his *Vote* to maintain it.

T H E R E is a Maxim, the Reasonableness of which no Person has ever yet disputed, that *of two Evils we ought to chuse the least*. From this Maxim it appears plainly, that in *some* Turns of Affairs the *heaviest* Burden may seem *light* to a Nation; even this *odious* Thing an Army, *desireable*. This may perhaps be our Case. And in order to know whether it is or not, we must consider the State of Affairs both *abroad* and *at home*: Both which, as far as it relates to the present Subject in debate, may be done in a few Words.—
Abroad all our neighbouring Potentates maintain a very considerable Standing Force—*At home* we are divided into Parties; and we have a *Popish* Pretender to the Crown, from whose Family Principle, his Religion, and the Manner he must come in (if he were to come in at all)

D

we

we have nothing to expect but *Papery* and *Arbitrary Power*.

OUR Circumstances being such, which it is notorious they are, I should hardly think it possible that any one should cast any Reflection upon the Government for maintaining a Standing *Force*, unless it were *those* who are avowed *Abettors* of that hateful Cause, the Consequences of which I have just now mentioned ; or *they* who are actuated by Apprehensions as ridiculous as that *Fear* which has caused some Men to kill themselves for the Dread of Death.

IF there be any whose Resentments against a Standing Army are so great, as to make them prefer these delightful Circumstances to it (and to such a Pitch of Folly, as absurd as it appears, the Violence of Prejudice and Passion has hurried *some* Men) let me caution them only, that before they suffer their Indignation to carry them *too* far, they consider whether this *mighty* Grievance may not remain,

main, though that was to happen which they *prefer* to it. Let me press them to ask their Consciences this Question, Which would be most *grievous* to them, an Army with *Liberty* and *Property*, or an Army with *Popery* and *Slavery*? Let them answer fairly, and they must *confess*, that if no Standing Forces were maintained in *England*, the Pretender would in all probability be our *King* in a very little time; and they must also *allow*, that he could not keep the Crown when he had got it, without a Standing *Army*: And what is worse, this Army would probably consist of *Foreigners*, to whose Assistance he must principally owe his Success: Foreign *Papists* too, who as *Papists* would think it their Duty to persecute, and as *Foreigners* would have no Mercy, no Compassion in the Persecution.

T H E R E is also another Circumstance which must inevitably render such a Standing Force much more *numerous*, and consequently much more *terrible* to the Nation. As it would be impossible for the

Pretender to be established here without the Aid of a foreign *Prince* ; so it is most certain, that no foreign *Prince* would afford him that Assistance, without making *some* Stipulation for *himself* in return for it. This *Stipulation* would probably be of *such* a Nature as that which the *Saxons* obtained for the Succour they gave the *Britons* ; some considerable Territories in the Bowels of the *Kingdom* ; and no doubt but the *same* Use would be made of that Territory : It would be soon filled with *Soldiers*, kept there to watch a favourable Opportunity of seizing that Crown to *themselves*, which they had before defended for *another*. It is easy to be imagined, that this Situation would require a *Standing Army*, very different from that which we maintain at present. Not only more *numerous*, as they would have a numerous Army to contend with ; not only more *expensive*, as they would be continually employ'd ; but more *independent* of the Nation, as they could be less subject to be called to account by the Legislature, in a time of *Confusion*, than a time of *Peace*.

IT is evident from what has been said, that the natural Consequence of disbanding the Army, would be a *Revolution* in our *Government*: A *Revolution* which must inevitably introduce a *Change* in our Religion, and a *Change* in our Constitution; but which would make no Alteration in the *Point* which is complained of, the *Point* of a *Standing Force*, unless it should be in this Particular, the Increase of its *Numbers*, and the Augmentation of its *Insolence*.

I don't doubt but it will be said, in opposition to this Argument, that the Interest of the *Pretender* in this Kingdom is at too low an Ebb to be apprehended, though we had no Army at all. It will be said, that I make a very poor Compliment to his *Majesty*, to suppose his Influence so weak, that he cannot be supported without a *Standing Force*; and that to hint any Thing of that Kind, seems to imply that his Conduct has been such as to render his Government disagreeable to the Nation.

WHAT

WHAT I have said with relation to the Necessity of supporting his *Majesty* by a Standing Force, cannot with any shew of Justice be construed to be any Reflection upon his Conduct since his Accession to the *Throne*. It is too *apparent*, that his Majesty has religiously adhered to the mutual Compact between him and his People; and it is too *notorious*, that he has ever made the Laws of the Land the Measure of his Government. The Reflection which my Words contain, falls upon *another* Quarter; not upon the *Prince*, but upon the *People*, whose *fickle* Dispositions and *restless* Spirits incline them continually to new *Revolutions*, and render them desirous of Change; not sufficiently considering the *Blessings* of their *present* Condition, and the *Miseries*, or at least the *Uncertainty* of that which would probably in that Case *succeed*.

I heartily wish that the *Pretender's* Interest may be at so *low* an Ebb, and the
Minds

Minds of the *People* so entirely *united*, that nothing may be apprehended from the Influence of the *one*, nor the Inconstancy of the *other*. But allowing that to be the Case, there still subsists the strongest Reason for a Standing Army. Though our Apprehensions of the *Pretender* may be *groundless*, or at least may be with Confidence *asserted to be so*, because it is an invidious Task to go about to prove the contrary; yet the *Persons* who ridicule those Fears, cannot deny, that we have Reason to guard against the numerous *Troops* of our *neighbouring* Princes. They must confess, that all the *Powers* on the *Continent* have within this *last* Century infinitely encreased their *Regular Forces*; and *owning this*, they will find it difficult to shew it reasonable, in point of *Politics*, for us not to do the *same*. *Force* can be only repelled by *Force*; and Self-Preservation teaches us, that if our Enemies are always in a Condition to *attack us*, we ought to keep ourselves always in a Posture of *Defence*.

IT is certain, indeed, that the Politics of *England* formerly were to guard against a *foreign* Invasion by a *naval* Force. Our principal Dependance was then, as it ought always to be, in large Fleets and numerous Squadrons. Our *Situation* points this out to us, and shews us that the *Sea* is our most natural Defence. But still that *Confidence* in our *natural* Fortification was not so great, that no regard was had to any *other*. The *Militia*, which then in all respects equall'd, in some, especially in Numbers, exceeded our present Standing Army, were constantly made ready upon any Emergency: So that we find a *Land Force* thought necessary to our Preservation in all Ages.

WERE the *Militia* of *England* now, what the *Militia* was then; were the Condition of *Europe* now, what its Condition was then; were the *Armies* of adjacent Princes now, the *same Armies* they were then: the *same* kind of Army would likewise be most convenient for
us;

us ; our Militia would then be the most proper Army, and any other Force of that kind would be a *dangerous* and *unnecessary* Burden upon the *Subject*. But what is the *Militia* of *England* now ? A vile Mob, *ragged, raw, undisciplined ; taken* from the Plough, *unaccustomed* to the Toils of War, *unacquainted* with the very Smell of Powder, and *Strangers* to the Sight of Blood, unless what they may have seen accidentally shed by a *Fist* or *Cudgel*. Are these the *Men* on whose Bravery we ought to hazard our Lives, our Fortunes, our Liberties, our Religion ? Are these the *Men* we ought to entrust with the *Preservation* of our *Country*, and our *Constitution* ? Or are these a *proper* Body of Men to be led against the *regular* Forces of our Neighbours ? To do this, would be to expose both *them* and the *Nation* to inevitable Ruin. Nor is it any Disparagement to the *English* Courage, to look upon them *untrained and ignorant* of military Discipline, as unable to resist a *well governed* and *experienced* Army. Their personal Bravery is as *great* as it ever was, and

E perhaps

perhaps *greater* still than that of any other *Nation*; and were they to engage with the *Militia* of any other Country, I should be under no Apprehensions for them. Nay, the very *Standing Army*, in defence of which I write, consists of the same Persons, *improv'd* by Custom, and *enured* to Dangers.

AS the Affairs of *Europe* are alter'd in this Circumstance of their *Troops*, so they are also very materially changed in many *other* Particulars. The *Sea* is no longer that invincible Barrier to us, which it formerly was. As *Navigation* is improved, it is extended to different *Countries*, and other *Nations* bear some Part with us in the *Empire* of the *Ocean*. The *Dutch* a few Years since were in a Condition to dispute with us the Superiority over that *Element*. The *Spaniards* have at this Hour above fifty Sail of *Line of Battle* Ships; and the *French* Fleets are now so considerable in Conjunction with *theirs*, that their *Naval* Preparations at this Moment alarm all *Europe*. The *Northern*

thern Powers too are far from being inconsiderable in this Particular, and the *Muscovites* are able to fit out very considerable *Fleets*, which are hardly to be ascertained, because their Numbers continually encrease. Thus we see that we are not only liable to a Descent by *Surprize*, but that our Neighbours are even able to attack us *openly* upon the Sea; surely then it would not be prudent in us to rely entirely upon the Favour of the *Wind* or *Weather*, or to hazard all upon the *Event* of one *decisive* Engagement. *Experience* has taught us, that we ought not to depend singly upon the *Services* of the *Navy*; and *History* shews us, that hardly any *Invasion* has been frustrated by their *Means*. The Duke of *Monmouth*, the Prince of *Orange*, and even the *Pretender* in the last Reign, landed upon our Shores in spite of all Opposition from our *Fleets*; nor is it possible for them ever to guard compleatly so vast a *Coast*.

THE *naked* Condition of the Kingdom of *England* is another Circumstance

which renders a *standing* Army absolutely *necessary*. If the Nation will not suffer any *Fortifications*, or any Places of *Strength*, from Apprehensions that some ambitious *Prince* may one time or other make use of them, to establish himself in an arbitrary *Sovereignty*; tho such *Apprehensions* may be highly *reasonable*, yet at the same time they must supply that *Defect* some other way. If the *Enemy* should ever land, and gain but one *Battle*, we have no *Garrison* to stop his *progress*, and to give us time to rally and recruit our *Forces*; he must instantly become Master of the *Field*, and at the same time Conqueror of *England*. This being the Consequence of one *Defeat*, we ought to be very careful to *guard* against an Accident so *fatal*, which can be done no *other* way than by always having *ready* a considerable *Army*.

IF any Man duly *reflects* upon these *Circumstances*, and *considers* the *Territories* which our *Troops* are to defend; it will be much more natural for him to entertain *Apprehensions* from their being too *few*,
than

than their being too *many*. The *standing* Forces, which our *modern* Patriots exclaim against, and call the *Standing Army* of England, amount indeed to 30000 Men, tho' it is improperly called the *English* Army, because but 18000 of that Number are paid by *England*. But let us see in what manner these Troops are *disposed*, and how it can be ever possible for them to be *employ'd* by the *Crown* against the Liberties of the *People*. Twelvethousand of them are quartered in *Ireland*, a considerable number in *Scotland*, and so many at *Gibraltar*, *Minorca*, and the *West Indies*, that those which remain in *England*, never exceed *Ten thousand* Men. Thus they are to be divided, that no body will pretend there could be any *danger* from them, if they were never to be *united*. Let us then *examine* a little farther, whether it would be possible for the *Crown* to effect this *Union*.

The 12000 Men upon the *Irish* Establishment, are perhaps the most *necessary* Troops in his Majesty's *Dominions*. The
old

old Irish are all *Papists*, and yet entertain their *antient* Animosities to the *English* Nation, and to the *Protestant* Religion. In number they are to the *Protestants* as at least eight to one : So that of one Million eight hundred thousand Souls, which that Kingdom is said to *contain*, one Million six hundred thousand are *Papists* ; all actuated by the same *bloody* Principles, which they have so *often* manifested in their *frequent* Rebellions ; all *ready* upon the *least* Encouragement, to take up *Arms* in favour of any *foreign* Power ; all waiting with *Impatience* for a *lucky* Conjuncture, to shake off the *English* Yoke, to recover their *Estates*, and to re-establish their own *Religion*.

IT is very plain, that the *Protestants* there, who amount at most but to 200000, are not *alone* able to keep under so great a Number of a *different* Persuasion. And if they were *alone* able, perhaps it might not be *prudent* to trust them *alone* with such a *Commission*. The *English* for a considerable time past, have found it *necessary*,
from

from the *State* of their *Commerce*, and from other *political* Considerations, to debar them of some *Privileges* in Trade, and to cramp them in *some* Particulars, which they loudly complain of. Both *Protestants* and *Papists* are equally involved in these Difficulties. They call this a *rigorous* Treatment, and are so far alienated in their Affections by it, that they are with reason suspected of being equally willing to shake off their *Dependence* upon us. This will ever be the case whilst they remain a *separate* Kingdom. From whence we see, that the Army of *Ireland* is absolutely necessary upon all *Accounts*; and we likewise, see that the *Condition* of that *Country* is such, that no Prince could withdraw from thence any very considerable Body of *Forces*, without risking palpably the Loss of that *Kingdom*. I have but one thing farther to observe upon this Head; that as that *Army* appears absolutely necessary to secure the *Dependence of Ireland* upon *England*, and as it appears also, that it is in no degree dangerous, so neither is it in any sort an *Expense* to *Great Britain*.

A S for that part of the Army which is now employ'd in *Scotland*, let any Gentleman give himself the trouble to look back even upon their *latest* Conduct, and he will find that their *Fidelity* is owing to nothing but their Apprehensions of those Troops. What *greater* Evidence of their *Importance* can there be, then the Bill now depending in *Parliament* to disarm a very great part of that *Kingdom*? And the same Circumstance that proves then Necessity of an Army in that *Country*, likewise proves that no *Prince* can be able with Safety to himself, to withdraw that *Army* from thence, to employ it against the *Liberties* of any other *part* of his Dominions.

I shall say very little to the Forces we maintain in the *West-Indies*. They are very *few* in number, and there is no reason to fear any ill Consequence from them. They are likewise so necessary, that I wish we may not in some time find ourselves obliged to maintain a much larger Force in those *Colonies*.

AS for the Troops which serve at *Port-Mahon* or *Gibraltar*, the Gentlemen who most exclaim against a *standing Army*, by *Art* and popular *Clamour*, have made that part of it necessary *now*, if it were not really so before. If that-Expence should prove *unnecessary*, or if it should be found hereafter *dangerous*, we know at whose door to lay it. If it should be found, they who roar'd most loudly against Profusion of Treasure; they who have inveigh'd most strenuously against those *Politicks* which engage *Great Britain* in Disputes upon the *Continent*, have themselves been guilty of *both*, to gratify their own *private Piques*, or to serve their own *private Ends*; what *Reward* shall be thought proper for them? or rather what *Punishment* invented adequate to their *Crimes*? Thus much I will venture to say, that if the People of *England* have reason to look upon any part of their Forces with a *jealous Eye*, it is that part of them employ'd in the *Mediterranean*. The Troops quarter'd either in *Scotland* or *Ireland*, as I have observ'd before, from the Importance and the Cir-

F

cumstances

cumstances of those *Countries*, can never be taken from the Station they are upon; because the *Prince* who attempts that, must lose *those* Kingdoms inevitable by it. But on the other hand, if an *ambitious* Prince should have occasion for the *Service* of the Troops in *Minorca* or *Gibraltar*, he might raze that Fortrefs as one of his Predecessors did *Tangier*; and would no doubt be well satisfy'd to purchase *arbitrary Power* over the rest of his *Territories* by the loss of that *one Place*.

UPON the whole, it appears evidently from all these Considerations, that tho' the National Army consists of 30,000 Men, the Nation bears the Expence of no more than 18,000. It appears likewise farther, that 8,000 of that Number are so *dispersed*, and otherwise so necessarily *employ'd*, that it would not be possible for a *Prince* ever so ill disposed, to make use of any considerable part of them to endanger the Liberties of the *Publick*. There remain therefore no more than 10,000 Men, to serve as a Foundation to all the flaming *Speeches* in Parliament, all the *Clamours*

mours of designing Men, all the *Apprehensions* of weak Men, and all the *insolent Reflections* of wicked Men upon his *Majesty* and his *Government*.

AND now I submit it seriously to the Conscience of every *impartial* Man, whether it is to be conceived that so small a Body of Troops could have it in their *Power*, if they could in their *Inclination*, to endanger the Constitution? Both the *one* and the *other* are equally impossible. What a *Force* upon the *Reason*, and what a *Reflection* upon the *Courage* of the People of *England*, must it be, to insinuate that *nine Millions* could be enslaved by the Arms of *ten thousand*? What Shifts and Inconsistencies are they driven to by the *Weakness* of their Argument, who at one time assert that the *natural* Bravery of the *English* is alone sufficient to protect them against the Insults and Invasions of all *Europe*; and are obliged in the same Breath to affirm, that the nine hundredth part of their own Number is able to strip them of every thing that is *nearest* and *dearest* them? How are we to account for that *Magick*

Power of the *Red Coat* and *Bandaliers*, by which the Person invested with them, is enabled to do such mighty *Feats*, and raised so much above the rest of *Human Race* ?

A S the Army wants Power, so also it most certainly must want Inclination to overturn its Country. To hint any thing to the contrary, is the greatest *Injustice* to them, and at the same time the greatest *Absurdity*. Consider them either as *Officers* or *Soldiers*, the *Absurdity* is still the same. Who are the *Officers* of this tremendous Army ? most of them Men of the *first* Rank both for *Quality* and *Fortune* in the Kingdom. Can any one then imagine, that they who have the greatest *Property* to preserve, should be the first to destroy *Property* ? Can it be supposed, that they whose *Privileges* depend upon the Confinement of the *Prerogative*, should be the first to render that *Prerogative* unbounded ? Or is it to be suspected, that they whose *Authority*, whose *Titles* and *Dignities*, or at least the *Advantages* attendant on them, so much depend upon those *Restrictions* which the *Princes* of
England

England lie under ; is it to be conceived I say, that these should be the *first* to take away those *Restrictions* ?

AS to the private *Soldiers*, if possible, still less can be apprehended from *them* ; all Natives of the Kingdom of *Liberty* ; their Blood boils with the Spirit of *Liberty*. That *Spirit* delivered down to them by their *Ancestors* for a thousand Generations, is as closely riveted in them as their very Souls, and as impossible to be work'd out, while the least Breath of *Life* remains : That *Life* which their *Forefathers* only priz'd, because they might *devote* it to the *publick Good*. What Reason have we then to think our Countrymen *degenerate* ? We have but *one*, and that is, to find an *Englishman* capable of believing this of *Englishmen*.

BUT tho' these *glorious* Principles should be now *extinct*, and a space of twenty or thirty years have been able to effect an Alteration which as many Centuries had never made before, still have we no reason for these Apprehensions.

Innu-

Innumerable other Considerations insure their *Duty* to their Country. The Method of their Disposition in Time of Peace is a great Security to the Publick. They are not shut up in Garrison Towns, like the Forces of other Princes, where they would encourage one another in a brutal Ferocity, and depriv'd of the Company of their Fellow-Subjects, imagine themselves of a different *Species* from them; but quarter'd up and down in private Houses, and subject to the *Civil Magistrates* as well as the rest of the Nation. They look upon themselves to be the *same* People, and to have the *same* Interests: They imbibe the *same* Principles, and enter into Familiarities and Friendships, which are the strongest *Ties* of Fidelity: They enjoy the *same* Privileges, the *same* Immunities, the *same* *Liberties*; nor could they abolish *those* of their Countrymen, without striking at the Root of their own: Nor could they enslave the *Nation*, without enslaving their own *Families*; without robbing their own Sons of their Birthright, and the Birthright of every Subject of *England*: Nor could they thus new model
the

the *British* Constitution, without applying their Swords to the Throats of their Parents, their Children, their Brothers, and their Friends, without involving all that is most valuable to them in one *general* Ruin; Nor could they so much as make the Attempt, without offering themselves, and even the Prince, a Sacrifice to the Prince's *Ambition*; for this is a *Maxim* which constant Experience has render'd incontestable, That no Prince in *England* can endeavour after arbitrary Power, but both himself and the Instruments by him employed in that *flagitious* Attempt, must fall a Victim to the *just Indignation* of the People.

I hope the Weight of these Arguments will appear as great to others as it does to me. I think the Truth of them is sufficiently evinced by numerous *Examples* in our own modern History: And I can bring two or three very strong *Instances* in the last Century, to shew how much the Army think themselves interested in the *national Welfare*; nay, even to prove that they have been the actual Guardians of the *Constitution*.

THE

THE first *Instance* I shall offer, is that of the Grand Rebellion it self, in which we find the Army active, nay effectually active, in opposing the arbitrary Encroachments of a Prince who, unfortunately for himself as well as his Country, had no other View but that of enslaving his *Subjects*, and no other Pleasure but that of oppressing his *People* : I say, in this they were effectually *active* ; for they gave a Lesson to all his Successors, which will hinder any that have common Prudence from treading in the same Paths. On this Occasion perhaps they went too far ; But then how hard is it for *human* Prudence to be perfect, and how difficult in Times of *such Extremity* to avoid being led astray by Men whose Arts and Pretences for the publick Good, were capable of deceiving even in Times of *coolest Consideration* ? 'Tis true, they were *deceived*, but they were not *corrupt* ; they were led into *Error*, but their Principles were still the same : And afterwards, by the Restoration of *Charles II.* they evidently prov'd, that

that the *false* Steps they had taken were owing to the Extravagance of their Zeal for *Liberty* ; but their *real* Intention was only to secure the Constitution, and not to overthrow it. And these were the Persons who after the whole Frame of Government had been entirely dissolved by the Tyranny of the *Prince*, the *Ambition* of *private Men*, and a *general Confusion*, restored the same Form of Government again, and left it to their Posterity safe and entire, but more secure, by the Examples they had made of *those* who endeavoured to destroy it.

THE second *Instance* I shall bring, is more to the Point, and demonstrates beyond all Contradiction, that the Army will never support the *Prince* in Arbitrary Power. I speak now of the Conduct of King *James's* Army. This was literally a *Standing Army*, maintained against the Sense of *Parliament*, consisting of 30,000 Men, made up in great part of *Irish Papists*; yet this very Army, numerous, dependent on the Crown, and modelled as it was, deserted him, and called in the

G

Prince

Prince of Orange to protect their *Liberties*.

I shall mention but one Instance more of their *generous* Behaviour, which, as it is of a later Date, will serve to shew that the same Spirit still subsists in our *Troops*. It is well known, that at the latter End of the Reign of Queen *Anne* the Plan was *laid*, and vigorously *pursued*, for bringing in the *Pretender*; the *Queen* herself was at the Bottom of the *Scheme*; the Nation, nay the very Parliament itself, were so artfully *managed*, and to that degree *corrupted*, that great numbers were ready to join in the Attempt, and the rest despair'd of being able to prevent it. Thus *every* Circumstance seemed to concur in the Ruin both of our *Religion* and *Liberties*, when the *Army* gloriously interposed, as it had done before. Their principal *Leaders* enter'd into Associations against it; which alarmed the *Ministry*, disconcerted and prevented the immediate Execution of their *pernicious* Designs, and by the Concurrence of a *lucky* Circumstance enabled his late *Majesty* to mount that Throne without

without any Opposition, which had otherwise been a considerable time before in the Possession of the *Pretender*.

ARE these the Men by whom our *Constitution* is endanger'd? Or have we Reason to fall into such dismal *Frights*, such childish *Pannicks* about an *Army*? Is there either Reason or Gratitude in such *Suspicion*. A Standing Army has not subsisted in *England* but since the *Revolution*; and upon every occasion that has since offer'd, they have shewn themselves the most *zealous* Advocates, and have proved themselves the most *effectual* Defenders of Liberty. Shall they be called *Patriots* who censure and reflect upon those Troops who have so gallantly saved the Constitution? The *Army* much better deserve that Appellation. The others only endeavour to prejudice the Nation against those who have deserved well of them; and to enflame the People against a Set of Men, who at least, if an *Evil* themselves, are necessary to prevent a *greater*. This Conduct can tend to nothing but to create *Confusion*, or to make the *Army* really

really as bad as they unjustly insinuate it to be : For this is certain, that if any thing will make an *honest* Man a *Traitor*, it is the Indignation of being unjustly *suspected*.

AFTER -I have said this, I shall submit it to the Judgment of my *Reader*, how far an Army not maintained by the *Prince*, but kept up only by *Parliament*, may differ from an Army paid out of the Prince's Purse, and singly subsisting by his Authority. I shall leave it farther to the same Consideration, how far an Army subsisting only from *Year to Year*, varied *annually*, and [paid by *Parliament*, may answer to the *Idea* generally convey'd by those terrible Words, a *Standing Army*.

I have now pretty fully discussed those Points which I proposed to consider in the Beginning of my Paper. I have shewn, that a *Standing Army* in general is not so dangerous as it is represented to be ; that it is unjustly esteemed the Bane of Liberty ; that it is a Remedy necessary to decay'd *political* Constitutions ; wrongfully accused of being the Ruin of those Constitutions
which

which are already incurable by *Corruption*, and which nothing can preserve. I have likewise shewn in particular, that the *Roman Army* was not the true Cause of the Ruin of the *Roman Empire*; and I have farther pointed out the *material* Differences between the Armies of *Great Britain* and those of other Nations. I have demonstrated not only the absolute Necessity this *Country* is under to have a *Standing Army*; but I have endeavoured to do that *Standing Army* Justice, in shewing how nobly they have hitherto served the Cause of *Liberty*, and how ready they are to maintain the same *Cause* again on all Occasions. My only *Desire* has been to undeceive my Countrymen, to *remedy* the Consequences of an *accursed* Affectation of *Popularity* in some Men, and to shew how ill grounded those *Clamours* are which have been industriously *spread*, to alienate the Affections of his Majesty's Subjects, incense them without Reason against his Ministers, and to render the very Parliament odious to the People they represent; or, in other words, to plunge the Nation into a State of *Confusion*, which they have good

Grounds

Grounds to know is the only State that can be ever propitious to themselves.

FOR the same Reasons I think I ought to acquaint, or remind the People of *England*, that the Forces of the Landgrave of *Hesse*, 12000 Men, which the Necessity of Affairs oblig'd us to keep in our Pay much longer than any one desir'd, (excepting those who made Advantage of their Declamations on so unpopular a Topick) have been lately dismiss'd our Service. I hope the Publick will do that Justice to the Administration, to conclude from thence, that they are always ready to take any Opportunity which the Circumstances of the Nation will permit, to lighten the Burdens of the People. It can never be suppos'd that they alone find Ease under those Burdens; on the contrary, they lie much heavier upon their Shoulders, than upon any other Person's in the Kingdom.

I shall beg leave also to acquaint or remind them of another considerable Charge which has been lately saved to the Publick,

lick, that of the Subsidies to the Duke of *Wolfenbuttle* and King of *Sweden*. I take the Liberty to do this myself, because the Gentlemen on the other Side of the Question have never Good-Nature enough to acquaint the Publick with what would be agreeable to them ; their Intelligence only consists in the most melancholly Account of Affairs that either Truth or Invention can supply them with. It may seem perhaps a little out of Season to do this now ; but I do it because I am confident such Art has been used to conceal these Circumstances, that two thirds of the People do still compute the Standing-Army of *England* with the Addition of the Troops of *Sweden*, *Wolfenbuttle* and *Hesse*.

I have been already much too tedious, and therefore I shall say but one word more upon the Conduct of these Gentleman. It ought to be observ'd, that whilst these Forces were maintained, a Foreign Army was represented as the most pernicious Army to the Nation, from the extravagant *Drains* of Cash occasioned by it. The Moment they are dismissed, the
Tables

Tables are turned, and our Liberties are instantly to be devoured by an *English* Army. And thus without either Shame or Remorse, they condemn one Day what the next they approve, and approve the next what the Day before they condemned. They shew themselves steady to no Principle but one, and that is to distress his Majesty and his Ministers, because he is too wise to admit them into their Posts. If that Misfortune were to fall upon the Nation, those very Gentlemen would be the last to advise the disbanding that Army they now exclaim against; they would find the Necessity of continuing their old Practice, and pursuing those Measures themselves which they blame in others. Nor could they be able, if in that Station, to give any one tolerable Reason for varying from the Conduct of the present Administration in this Particular; unless they used this Argument, that the People losing by their Removal from among them the principal Promoters of Sedition and Abettors of Rebellion, the publick Tranquillity might be more easily preserv'd.

F I N I S.

are
Ar-
e or
hat
the
ned.
rin-
his
is
. If
Na-
the
my
uld
old
ures
ers.
ion,
ary-
Ad-
hey
sing
the
bet-
illi-